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should conclude, more trenchantly, that neither view is right? When Graham
remarks that ‘Anaximenes might not explain what the precise relation is
between the original stuff and the stuffs that arise from it’ (p. 90), it is difficult
not to agree. And in that case we should ascribe neither MM nor GST—nor
any other articulated scientific theory—to Anaximenes.
There is very much to admire in Graham’s book. The detailed interpreta-
tions, which of course occupy most of its pages, are almost always carefully
done; and they contain a number of subtleties. The criticism of other scholars
is almost always polite, and it is far more often right than wrong. The puffs on
the dust-jacket assure us that ‘the book makes a significant contribution’ or
‘an excellent contribution to our understanding of Presocratic philosophy’;
and, for once, the puffs are right. But the revisionary view does not persuade
me. But then it wouldn’t, would it? After all, ‘Barnes follows traditional, even
Aristotelian, models almost slavishly’ (p. 21, n. 57).





Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-
Century British Philosophy, by James Harris. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2005. Pp. xv + 264. H/b £52.00, P/b £19.99.
James Harris’s book, Of Liberty and Necessity, is a remarkable achievement. It is
the first book to provide a true chronicle of the rich and intricate discussion in
early modern Britain of the relationship between freedom and necessity. The
figures it discusses range from the towering figures of early modern British
thought (Locke, Hume, Reid), to the well-known (Clarke, Collins, Edwards),
to the under-appreciated and insufficiently discussed in recent times (Kames,
King, Beattie, Priestley), to the obscure (Watts, Hartley). As a result, the book
makes available a world of scholarly material that few contemporary historians
of philosophy are even aware of. In addition, the book possesses a rare sensitiv-
ity to nuanced differences between similar philosophical positions.
Although the book is organized by figure, rather than by the type of posi-
tion advocated by particular figures—each chapter is devoted to a figure, or
sometimes more than one, beginning with Locke and progressing to a collec-
tion of post-Reidian philosophers—the book is none the less very careful to
situate the positions of those it discusses with respect to one another and with
respect to the intellectual context of the time. Broadly speaking, the figures it
discusses fall into three camps: the indifferentist libertarians, the (what might
be called) ‘moral necessitarian’ libertarians, and the necessitarians. The indif-
ferentists think that a person in the same circumstances, with the same dispo-
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sitions, the same history, and the same mental state as someone who just chose
to do something might choose the same thing, or might choose something
entirely different. The moral necessitarian libertarians think that although, in
actuality, such a person will choose the same thing the agent chose, none the
less, any of a variety of choices could have been made by him. And the necessi-
tarians think that such a person will choose as the agent actually chose and
could not have chosen any differently. Harris indicates both the subtle manner
in which figures who fall into the same camp differ from one another in their
substantive positions, and also the ways in which they respond to their prede-
cessors, and influence their successors. Thus, although the book is a survey,
and so aspires to breadth rather than depth, it is the best type of survey: it
identifies the philosophical ground occupied by each of the figures it discusses
with sufficient detail and precision to allow others with less broad aims to
know where to look for what fits their particular interests.
Quite rightly, Harris sees the eighteenth century discussion of freedom of
will as beginning in the late seventeenth—with Locke’s convoluted and con-
fusing discussion of the issue in the longest chapter of the Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (Peter Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975,
pp. 233–87). Harris claims that the most important contribution made by
Locke’s discussion to the eighteenth century debate that followed was method-
ological. Locke emphasizes an ‘experimental’ method for tackling the question
of liberty and necessity; he describes what we can glean about the nature of
our agency primarily through introspection, but also through observation of
the behaviour of others. This contrasts with approaches involving reflection
on metaphysical issues such as the nature of causality or modality, or on theo-
logical issues such as the contingency, if any, remaining to actions given that
God foresees them. Harris sees the application of Locke’s ‘historical, plain
method’ to the question of liberty and necessity as Locke’s most important leg-
acy in the eighteenth century British discussion that followed.
This is not false, exactly, but there may be other more substantive contribu-
tions of Locke’s to the ensuing debate. Locke recognized, for instance, that
there is a peculiarly human capacity to commit oneself to actions, where these
commitments go beyond the sort involved in desire and differ significantly
from the sort involved in belief about what is most worth pursuing. He identi-
fied, that is, a special role in motivational psychology for the will, a role that he
took desires, and judgements about what it is best to do, to be incapable of
occupying. The debate in the eighteenth century was framed in significant
respects that Harris fails to emphasize by Locke’s conception of the will, a con-
ception that, to be sure, Locke took himself to have discovered by applying his
‘historical, plain method’ to the question of the nature and limits of our pow-
ers to choose and act.
Although it is of great interest to see described the views held by some figure
that become objects of critical scrutiny by others, it is fascinating also to see
described, as we do in Harris’s book, the views of one figure that then seem to
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disappear, ignored by those who follow. Such is the case with an appealing idea
of William King’s. King was an indifferentist, and he found a novel way to
respond to one of the most difficult problems for indifferentist positions.
It is standardly objected that under indifferentism there is no reason to want
freedom. Indifferentist freedom includes a capacity to choose acts of no value;
it includes a capacity to break loose from reason itself. The objection can be
presented also in terms of the explanation of free action: there can be no expla-
nation of action, of the sort that free actions intuitively admit, under the indif-
ferentist view. To cite something of value about the action in order to explain
the doing of it, is to cite something external to the will that pushed or pulled it.
But the indifferentist is committed to the claim that any such push or pull
undermines freedom. This commitment, together with the claim that the
value of an act has its source in something external to the will, seems to com-
mit the indifferentist to the absurd claim that free acts do not admit of expla-
nation through appeal to the value of the act. King’s response is to deny that
everything of value about an act derives from something external to the will;
instead, acts are sometimes of value in virtue of having been chosen.
What conception of the will would a philosopher like King need to hold in
order to think that acts have value in virtue of being chosen? Harris takes a
stab at an answer that he takes to have been King’s:
There is a happiness felt in the complete and proper exercise of all the powers one
has, and therefore there is a happiness in making completely free choices, choices
not determined by anything other than, as we might say, willfulness itself. (p. 45)
Harris’s idea draws its appeal from a conception of the faculties, from the
period and before, according to which each has its proper function and
according to which one form of pleasure consists in a faculty serving its proper
function. Only some conceptions of the will’s function, however, will support
King’s response to the objection. If, for instance, the function of the will is the
performance of acts of antecedent value, then there can be value deriving from
the fact that an act is willed only if the act is already of antecedent value. King,
then, is committed to thinking that the purpose of willing is attained when the
will is undetermined from without. Under an alternative conception of the
will, the exact opposite is true: the will’s purpose can be attained only if it acts
with the help of other faculties that allow us to recognize value in the potential
objects of choice.
As is well-known, it is difficult to adjudicate disputes about the function of
any particular thing. What would count as evidence for King’s conception of the
point of willing over a competitor? In fact, one worries that there can be no non-
circular way of settling such disputes. One who thinks that the purpose of the
will is to guide action independently of external influences asserts something
about the value of choosing: we find its distinctive form of value when none of
the determinants of choice are external to the faculty for making choices. But
acceptance of that claim is exactly what is in dispute. Breaking the circle requires
finding independent grounds for asserting that the will has some particular pur-
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pose, and it is very difficult to see what grounds there could be for any such
claim. Perhaps King offers such grounds. Determining what his grounds might
be, if he has any, seems to me to be the next thing that needs to be done in the
critical and historical evaluation of his contribution to the free will debate.
The best complement that can be paid to a work of philosophy—in con-
trast to, say, a novel—is not just to read it, but to use it to do more philosophy.
Anyone who reads Harris’s wonderful book will find themselves wanting to
pay Harris that very complement.
School of Philosophy gideon yaffe
Mudd Hall
University of Southern California




Ethical Intuitionism, by Michael Huemer. New York: Palgrave Macmillian,
2005. Pp. xxv + 309. H/b $85.00.
This is among the best books in metaethics, and one of the best defenses of
ethical intuitionism, in recent years. It is admirably clear and very thorough,
covering a wide range of important metaethical topics and views. While it is
well suited for use in advanced ethics classes, it will surely be of interest to any-
one working in the field. The more difficult and challenging sections of the
book, those which typically involve high level discussions of recent work, are
starred so that casual readers can pass them over, but more advanced readers
will find them interesting, clear, and thoughtful. 
Most of the book is devoted to an explication and defense of ethical intui-
tionism, but Huemer considers a variety of metaethical views, including non-
cognitivism, subjectivism, nihilism, and naturalism. After a helpful introduc-
tory chapter, in which Huemer discusses what it is for a characteristic to be
objective, he examines non-cognitivism, subjectivism, and reductionism in
chapters two, three, and four. He covers a wide variety of views, including indi-
vidual and cultural relativism, the divine command theory, the ideal observer
theory, and both ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ reductionism.
Many of the objections to these views will be familiar to those in the field,
but they are well explained and the pacing is good. Huemer also discusses
recent work which attempts to respond to the standard objections. So, for
example, in discussing non-cognitivism he examines the views of Hare, Gib-
bard, Blackburn, and Timmons. In discussing the ‘is–ought’ problem he
explains the views of Searle, Geach, Prior, and Karmo.
In the second half of the book, chapters five through nine, Huemer defends
a form of intuitionism ‘according to which terms such as ‘good’ refer to objec-
